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procedural effect to be given to a violation, the court did not com-
mit the error of adopting too rigid an approach but rather pre-
ferred flexibility. The word formula enunciated, prima facie
evidence of negligence, is both familiar and workable .
Nevertheless the Sterling Trusts Coiporation decision left many
questions unanswered. The Supreme Court did not explain what
it meant by primafacie evidence of negligence nor what procedural
effect it would have . It did not clearly define which excuses wouldbe
tolerated nor who had the onus of proof with regard to them.
Neither did the court fully discuss all of the policy issues inherent
in their choice and the priorities accorded them . Nor did the
Supreme Court indicate how far their decision would extend,
whether to tail-light cases alone, to all lighting cases, to all equip-
ment cases or to all violations of statutes . All of these questions
were left for the future. The Sterling Trusts Corporation decision
is, therefore, extremely significant for what it has decided ; how-
ever, it may be even more significant because of the gaps that
remain unfilled .
ALLEN M. LINDEN*
CONFLICT OF LAWS-VALIDITY OF FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREE
BAsED ON JURISDICTIONAL GROUND NOT RECOGNIZED IN ENGLISH
LAW AT TIME WHEN OBTAINED-SUBSEQUENT CHANGE IN ENGLISH
LAw-RETROsPECTIVE OPERATION OF Travers v. Holley'-PuBmc
POLIcy.-At the end of the nineteenth century, English courts
became fully committed by judicial decision to the view that the
only domicile of a married couple is that of the husband. Further,
a marriage could only be dissolved in England if the husband was
domiciled there at the time at which the proceedings were coni-
menced .1 In selecting the domicile of the husband as the sole basis
of jurisdiction, English judges were actuated by the belief that all
other civilized countries had adopted the same criterion and that,
since a husband can only have one domicile at a time and his wife
shares it, there could be only one court in the civilized world com-
petent to dissolve a marriage at any given time .
*Allen M . Linden, of Osgoode Hall Law School, Visiting Professor of
Law, University of California, Berkeley (1966-67) .
'[19531 P . 246, [195312 All E.R . 794 (C.A.).
2 Le Afesurier v. Le Mesurier, [1895] A.C . 517, 11 T.L.R . 481 (P.C .).
The 1857 Matrimonial Causes Act, 20 & 21 Vict ., c . 85, which bestowed
upon an English court the power to dissolve marriages made no express
provision as to what marriages it could dissolve .
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English courts adopted the same criterion for recognizing the
jurisdiction of foreign courts to dissolve marriages and would only
recognize foreign decrees of divorce which were pronounced by
thecourts of the husband's domicile at the commencement of the
proceedings. Domicile became the exclusive common law basis
for domestic jurisdiction and for recognition of foreign decrees.
English courts thought that the possibility of limping marriages
would thus be avoided. Actually, the rule was merely an applica-
tion of the more general rule of English conffict of laws that the
legal capacity of a natural person is regulated solely by the law of
his domicile, so long as this does not offend against English rules
of public policy.
It soon became apparent that domicile was not a universal
criterion . In many countries, the nationality of the spouses, their
common residence or that of the petitioner alone or the mere sub-
mission of both or even one party to the court, is a sufficient basis
for divorce jurisdiction . However, so long as the jurisdiction of
English courts to dissolve marriages was limited by intractable
precedent to those of which the husband was domiciled in England
at the date of the commencement of the proceedings, they refused
to recognize a foreign decree pronounced by the courts of a
country in which the husband was not domiciled at the time the
proceedings were begun. Gradually though, the courts began to
doubt the wisdom of the old common law rules of the unity of
domicile of the husband and wife and of the exclusive jurisdiction
of the forum domicilli, particularly when it became obvious that
these rules, in combination, were causing great hardship to the
deserted wife who could only have recourse to the courts of the
country of her husband's domicile to obtain dissolution of her
marriage . Clearly, something had to be done to mitigate the rigour
of these rules . Thus, during the twentieth century, the English Par-
liament and then the courts began to give relief to both English and
foreign wives. On two occasions the English Parliament extended
the grounds on which English courts -might assume jurisdiction to
dissolve a marriage .
The Matrimonial Causes Act was enacted in 1937 and in
section 13 provided that :3
Where a wife has been deserted by her husband or where her husband
has been deported from ,the United Kingdom under any law for the
time being in force relating to the deportation of aliens, and the hus-
band was immediately before the desertion or deportation domiciled
3 1 Edw. 8 & I Geo . 6, c . 57 .
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in England and Wales, the court shall have jurisdiction for the purpose
ofany proceedings under Part V111 ofthe principal Act notwithstanding
that the husband has changed his domicile since the desertion or
deportation .
Since January Ist, 1938, when a husband, who iq domiciled in
England, deserts his wife and establishes a new domicile in an-
other country, she is no longer bound to follow him to his new
country in order to obtain a divorce. She can still sue him in
England.
In 1949, the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) ACt4 in
section I added a new jurisdictional ground :
The High Court in England shall have jurisdiction in proceedings by a
wife for divorce, notwithstanding that the husband is not domiciled
in England, if-(a) the wife is resident in England and has been ordin-
arily resident there for a period of three years immediately preceding
the commencement of the proceedings, and (b) the husband is not domi-
ciled in any other part of the United Kingdom or in the Channel Is-
lands or the Isle of Man .
Since December 16th, 1949, when a wife has been ordinarily
resident in England for three years, although her husband is dom-
iciled abroad, she can sue hirn for divorce in the English courts .
These two Acts make it nowimpossible to maintain that under
English rules of conflict of laws a person's legal capacity, so far as
it results from the existence or non-existence of the married status,
is regulated solely by the law of his or her domicile, since English
courts may in certain circumstances dissolve the marriage of per-
sons not domiciled in England.
Since these statutes do not provide for the recognition of for-
eign divorce decrees, the question arose whether, without specific
statutory provision, this extension of domestic jurisdiction, worked
a corresponding extension of the common law rules of recogni-
tion.5 Without hesitation, the English courts answered in the
affirmative and soon began to give relief to wives who obtained
foreign divorces.
Already, in 1906, Armitage v. the Attorney General' had, in an
indirect way, extended the basis for recognizing the jurisdiction
of foreign courts . The English court recognized a divorce decree
pronounced in South Dakota, on proof that the decree would be
4 12, 13 & 14 Geo . 6, c. 100 . The Act was repealed by the Matrimonial
Causes Act, 1950, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c . 25, but the rule of s . I was repeated in
s. 18 (1) (b) . This section is now repealed and re-enacted by s . 40 of the
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965, 13 & 14 Eliz . 2, c. 72 .
5The Matrimonial Causes (War Marriages) Act 1944, dealt with recog-
nition of foreign decrees, 7 & 8 Geo. 6, c. 43 .
6 [1906] P . 135, 75 L.J.P . 42, 22 T.L.R. 306.
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recognized in New York where the parties were domiciled in the
eyes of the court. In other words, where a foreign -decree is recog-
nized as valid by the courts of the country of the husband's domi-
cile'at the time the decree was pronounced, the English courts will
treat it as effective to alter his married status .
The first serious attempt to extend the common law basis for
recognition took place in 1953 in the now famous case of Travers
v. Holley7 decided by the English Court ofAppeal. It was held that
English courts should recognize in foreign courts a like jurisdiction
to that which they claim for themselves . If English courts have,
by statute, jurisdiction to grant divorces to wives whose husbands
are not domiciled in England, a corresponding jurisdiction should,
as a matter of common law, be accorded to foreign courts, to grant
divorces to wives whose husbands were not domiciled in the for-
eign countries where the divorces were sought . As Hodson L.J .
said :8 "Where, as here, there is in substance reciprocity, it would
be contrary to principle and inconsistent with comity if the courts
of this country were to refuse to recognize a jurisdiction which
mutatis mutandis .they claim for themselves ." The nexusi falling
short of domicile, between the petitioning wife and the foreign
forum which was relevent in Travers v. Holley, was that the wife
should have been deserted at a time when her husband was domi-
ciled in this foreign country. As a result of this decision, if a wife
domiciled in a foreign country is there deserted by her husband
who then changes his domicile and she obtains a divorce in the
courts of his former domicile, this divorce will be recognized in
England. The decision was a bold and beneficial piece of judicial
legislation intended to reduce the incidence of "limping marriages" .
In Travers v. Holley, the jurisdiction claimed by the English
court (in a domestic context) was that conferred by the deserted
wife provision of the Act of 1937 .9 In 1958, in Robinson-Scott v.
Robinson-Scott, 10 reciprocity was established by reference to sec-
7 Supra, footnote 1 . In that case it will be recalled that a decree pro-
nounced under the deserted wife statute of New South Wales was held
entitled to recognition in England on the ground that English law since
1937 provided for a substantially similar basis of jurisdiction . Travers v.
Holley was not followed in Fenton v. Fenton, [1957] V.L.R. 17 . The Full
Court of Victoria treated the existing judge-made rule as to recognition
of foreign decrees of dissolution of marriages as too firmly established to
be susceptible of alteration by judicial decision . This case was abrogated
by s. 4 of the Marriage (Amendment) Act 1957 (Victoria), No. 6186. See
now s . 95 (2) of the Commonwealth Matrimonial Causes Act, 1959,
No. 104, of 1959 .
6 Ibid., at p . 257 (P .) . Supra, footnote 3 .
10 [19581 P. 71, [1957] 3 W.L.R . 842, [19571 3 All E.R. 473 . See R. H .
Graveson, (1958), 7 Int . and Comp. L. Q. 166 .
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tion 18 (1) (b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, which deals
with the residence of the wife." The court held that a divorce ob-
tained by a wife who had been resident in Switzerland for over
three years would be recognized in England, even though her hus-
band was not domiciled in that foreign country at the time of the
commencement of the proceedings. The principle of Travers v.
Holley was refined by Karminski J. The Swiss court had exercised
jurisdiction on the basis that the wife had, in the circumstances,
acquired a separate domicile from that of the husband. But the
basis upon which the Swiss court proceeded was not considered
relevant . What mattered was whether, on analogous facts, the
English courts could have taken jurisdiction : "It is not necessary
that the foreign statutory grounds of jurisdiction be substantially
similar to the English ones . It is sufficient that facts exist which
would enable the English courts to assume jurisdiction7. 11 How-
ever, the foreign divorce decree must not have been granted by the
courts ofthe country where the wife had only transitory residence."
Recognition of the effectiveness of a foreign decree granted by the
courts of the domicile does not depend upon the grounds upon
which the foreign court had acted. This proposition should have
equal application to the recognition of a foreign decree under the
Travers v. Holley doctrine . Thus, in Janus,-kiewicz v. Januszkieu, iez,
Nitikman J. of the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench said :"
"Having found in the case before me that the Polish court had
jurisdiction to entertain the suit for divorce, there remains merely
the question : Is it necessary that the grounds for divorce be such
as are required in our jurisdiction? The answer to that must be in
the negative . Once it is recognized the foreign court has jurisdiction
to deal with the matter, it follows that a divorce granted by that
court, on grounds proper to it, is valid, and must be so found by
our courts ."
To sum up, in England today, the courts will recognize the
validity of a foreign decree of divorce rendered either by the court
of the husband's domicile or the court of the wife's three-year
residence, or that of the country where her husband was domiciled
when he deserted her. English courts will also uphold a foreign
11 Supra, footnote 4 .
12supra, footnote 10, per Karminski J ., at p . 88 (P.) .
13 Mountbatten v. Mountbatten, [1959] P. 43 .
14 (1965), 55 D.L.R . (2d) 727, at p . 735 . The Polish court had exercised
jurisdiction to declare the marriage qissolved in circumstances which the
Canadian courts themselves recognize as a sufficient basis for taking
jurisdiction . See Divorce Jurisdiction Act, R.S.C., 1952, c . 84, s . 2. This
section is analogous to s . 13 of the 1937 Matrimonial Causes Act (U.K .)
which was relevant in Travers v. Holley, supra, footnote 3 .
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divorce decree ifits validity is admitted by the law of the husband's
domicile .
What still remained unclear until recently, was whether the
doctrine of Travers v. Holley could be made retrospective to
divorces granted before the passage of the statutes extending the
grounds ofdomestic jurisdiction of English courts. Should a foreign
decree be recognized if it were pronounced at a date prior to the
conferment of comparable non-domiciliary jurisdiction in the
English courts?
This problem had not escaped the attention of some scholars .
In 1961, Dean Z. Cowen and Professor Mendes da Costa had this
to say :"
rn Travers v . Holley, Hodson L.J . pointed to the fact that at the material
time at which the New South Wales proceedings were instituted, the
comparable English legislation was in force ; but in Arnold v . Arnold
recognition was given to the foreign decree notwithstanding the fact
that foreign proceedings were instituted and a decree pronounced at a
time when three years' residence was not yet "a ground of jurisdiction
in English law. As a practical matter, this is a good result, as it will
tend to avoid limping marriages, and it is submitted that as a matter of
common law, the decisive date should be the time at which the foreign
", Matrimonial Causes Jurisdiction (1961), p . 86 . See also : G . D.
Kennedy, "Reciprocity" in the Recognition of Foreign Judgments : The
Implication of Travers v . Holley (1954), 32 Can. Bar Rev . 359, at p . 367
who suggests that the principle of reciprocity is retroactive, there being
no rule of public policy which prevents it being so . The date of remarriage
is the decisive date. If that date follows the date of the change in the muni-
cipal law, the English court can disregard the fact, that at the time when
it was pronounced the foreign decree was invalid in English law . J. K.
Grodecki, in Conflicts of Laws in Time (1959), 35 Dr . Y . B . Int . L. 58, at
p . 62, believes that the material time at which the statutory similarity must
exist is the time of the institution of the English proceedings . Contra :
Dicey, Conflict of Laws (7th ed., 1958), p . 322, par (5) where it is stated :
"The material time at which the similarity must exist is the time when the
foreign divorce proceedings are instituted." The words of Hodson L.J .
in Travers v . Holley, supra, footnote 1, at p . 256 (P .), are referred to as tile
basis of this statement : "Since 1937 this exception has been largely ex-
tended first by the Matrimonial Causes (War Marriages) Act, 1944 (a
temporary war measure) and later by the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950,
s . 18 . It is unnecessary t~ consider the effect of these later statutory pro-
visions since, at the material time, when the New South Wales proceedings
were instituted, the Act of 1937 was in force and s . 13 of this Act corres-
ponds in substance with the provision under which the New South Wales
court claimed jurisdiction between the parties to this appeal." (Italics
mine) .
Professor J. H. C. Morris, in an article entitled The Time Factor in the
Conflict of Laws (1966), 15 Int . and Comp . L.Q . 422, at p . 425 says : "The
foreign divorce which was recognised in Travers v . Holley on the analogy
of the English statute of 1937 had been obtained in 1943 . The question
therefore arises, would the decision have been the same if the divorce had
been obtained before 1937? Since the decision would have been inconceiv-
able before the statutory change made in that year, it is submitted that on
principle no divorce granted before 1937 or 1949, as the case may be,
should be recognised in England under the doctrine of Travers v . Holley."
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proceedings come into question, so that if at that time there is a com-
parable basis of jurisdiction in the forum, the foreign decree should
be recognized .
Actually, in both Travers v. Holley and Arnold v. Arnold,", the
court did not consider the retrospective operation of the statutes
involved . This problem was the major issue in Indyka v. 1ndyka17
just decided by the English Court of Appeal. Lord Denning ex-
pressed the opinion that : "If a wife was resident in a foreign
country for three years and validly obtained a divorce there, that
is, in the courts of her three-year residence, we should recognize it
as valid here for all relevant purposes, no matter, whether the
divorce was granted before or after December, 1949." 11
In this case, the wife who had always resided in Czechoslovakia
but whose Czech-born husband had acquired a domicile of choice
in England in 1946, was granted a decree of divorce by a court in
Czechoslovakia in January 1949, which became final in February
1949 . In 1959, the husband went through a ceremony of marriage
with his second wife. Six years later, she petitioned for a divorce
on the ground of her husband's cruelty. By an amended answer,
the husband claimed that the marriage was void for bigamy in that
the Czech decree purporting to dissolve his previous marriage was
not valid in England, as he was domiciled in England at the time
when it wasmade. Accordingly, he was still married to his first wife .
In a reserved judgment, Latey J., on the question of the validity
of the English marriage, held that the Czech decree pronounced in
1949 was not valid in English law, with the result that there was no
marriage to dissolve and, he made a declaration of nullity . Latey J.
based his decision on the view that the Act of 1949-by which,
as noted, the English courts first assumed jurisdiction to grant
divorces to wives domiciled abroad but resident in England
and the consequential change of recognition of foreign decrees-
altered the law in December 1949, prospectively and not retro-
spectively . He accepted the rationale of Travers v. Holley'9 and
Robinson-Scott v. Robinson-Scott" but was prepared to apply
16 [1957] P . 237 . In that case a Finnish decree of divorce was recognized
notwithstanding that it was granted in 1940, that is nine years before the
Forning into effect of the English Act of 1949 . But the ground upon which
jurisdiction was based is not clear : See J . H. C . Morris, The Australian
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1959 (1962), 11 Int . and Comp. L. Q. 641 . Se e
also V . L. Korah, Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees (1957), 20 Mod.
L . Rev . 278, at p. 280.
[196613 W.L.R. 603 (C.A .), rev'ing [1966] 2 W.L.R . 992 (P .) .
Is Ibid., at p . 609 .
19 Supra, footnote 1 . Note that in the present case the husband did not
desert the first wife in Czechoslovakia, the latter having refused to live
with him in England .
20 Supra, footnote 9 .
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it . only if the first wife had obtained a divorce in Czechoslovakia
after December 1949 . Since the 1949 statute was enacted eleven
nionths. after the foreign decree was granted, such deprep could not
be recognized in England. , -
On appeal by the second wife, the decision of Latey J. was
reversed by a majority of the Court of Appeal . Lord Denning was
of the opinion that : "Ifthe courts of England were not to recognize
this Czech divorce, it would be a disgrace to the law that should
prevail between nations."21 Applying Travers v. Holley". and Robin-
son-Scott v. Robinson-Scott,1 .3 two decisions which have proved
most beneficial to foreign wives, his Lordship properly points out
that the doctrine of these cases is judge-made law, "and the judges
can make it retrospective to divorces before 1949 if it is just and
proper Ito do S011.24And in his opinion, it is the policy ofthe English
law that it should be so .
The majority of the Court of Appeal believed that Latey J. was
wrong to think that the doctrine of Travers v. Holley was based on
an implied enactment by Parliament in December 1949 . The doc
trine is not based on any implication in the English statute. This
stat
,
ute only deals with the jurisdiction of English courts to grant a
divorce ; it does not say a word about the recognition of foreign
di
,
vorces . The English rules of recognition of foreign divorce de-
crees are common law rules and nothing else . For this reason also,
the application of the doctrine does not depend on a showing of
gu
,
bstantially similar form in the foreign domestic ground of
jurisdiction .
,	Diplock L.J . bases his decision supporting the validity of the
Czech divorce on the view that it is, ". . . a well established prin-
ciple of public policy applied by English courts that, so far as it
lie's within their power to ensure it, the status of a person as mar-
ried or single should be the same in every country which he visits,
that is that there should not be 'limping marriages' "-I' Existing
rules as . to recognition of foreign decrees must be constantly re-
examined, ". . . in the light of changed social conditions and of
developments in the public policy towards the dissolution of
marriages which the statutory alterations in their own jurisdiction
disclosed" .26
Diplock L.J . believes that the underlying ratio decidendi of
Travqs.,v. Holley is that :27
21 Supra, footnote 17, at p. 607 .
22 Supra, footnote 1 .
	
21 Supra,,footnote 10.
21 Supra, footnote 17, at p . 609 .
21 Ibid., at p. 610 . 26 Ibid., at p . 612 . 17 Ibid., at p . 613 .
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If it be right that the public policy which underlay the original judge-
made rules both as to the jurisdiction of the English courts to dissolve
marriages and as to the recognition of the effectiveness of foreign
decrees is to avoid the creation of marriages which limped in England
or abroad, this policy would lead the English courts to recognise as
effective in England every decree of dissolution of marriage pronounced
by a foreign court which they were not inhibited from so recognising by
the competing rule that the English courts do not recognise as effective
to alter the legal rights in this country of any person any judgment of a
foreign court given in circumstances in which nuttatis mutandis the
English courts themselves would not have jurisdiction to adjudicate by
reason of the subject-matter of the litigation or the parties thereto . It
follows, therefore, that to the extent that that inhibition is removed by
the extension of the jurisdiction of the English courts themselves to
decree dissolution of marriages, the public policy requires the English
courts to recognise the effectiveness of decrees of dissolution of mar-
riage pronounced by foreign courts in exercising their jurisdiction in
the new circumstances which inutatis inutandis would entitle an English
court to exercise its extended jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage .
Furthermore, one of the most important consequences flowing
from this decision is brought to light by his Lordship when he
points out that :'s
. . . the rule as to the recognition of foreign decrees of dissolution of
marriage can no longer be regarded as merely part of a more general
rule of English private international law that a natural person's legal
capacity in this country is regulated by the law of his domicile . It is a
separate rule in its own right about recognition ofjudgments of foreign
courts. The decision in Travers v. Holley, [1953] P. 246, creates an
exception to the more general rule that the law of his domicile alone
governs legal capacity by recognising the right of some courts which
are not courts of a natural person's domicile by a decree of dissolution
of marriage to effect changes in his legal capacity in England in so far
as this is dependent upon the existence or non-existence of his married
status but not otherwise . But the ratio decidendi of Travers v. Holley,
as I have expanded it, does not, in the absence of such a decree, permit
an English court to treat any law other than the law of a natural per-
son's domicile as regulating in any respect his legal capacity, including
his married status, in this country . This was what was decided by
Davies J . in Mountbatten v . Mountbatten, [1959] P . 43.
On the question whether the court should recognize the ef-
fectiveness of the Czech decree rendered on a jurisdictional basis
similar to that which, a few months later, was bestowed upon the
English courts, Diplock L.J . considers, as the relevant date, the
husband's second marriage in 1959, for if it were ineffective, then
he lacked the capacity to marry again. He acknowledges the
cogency and logic of the reasoning which led Latey J. to the con-
*8 Ibid., at p . 614 .
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elusion that, ". . . the law is that when the English municipal law
is altered to widen the divorce jurisdiction of the English courts,
comity and reciprocity require the appropriately widened recog-
nition of decrees pronounced abroad after and not before, the
change in the municipal law : the two changes coincide in point
oftime and are both prospective", 19 but rejects it as, in his opinion :
We are dealing yvith a rule of public policy whose object is to prevent
creating lllimping~marriages" . 30
The Act of 1949 removed an inhibition upon the application of t
,
hat
policy to the recognition of decrees of dissolution of marriage pro-
nounced by foreign courts . i n the circumstances in which the Czech
decree was made. Ever since that inhibition has been removed, it'has,
in my opinion been open to this court to say :
"We now recognise that residence of a wife petitioner within the
jurisdiction of a court of a foreign state for three years immediately
preceding her petition for a divorce is a sufficient nexus between
the spouse and that foreign state on Aich to found the jurisdiction
of its court effectively to dissolve their marriage."
And I see no reason why if we now iecognise that nexus as sufficient,
we are not entitled to recognise the validity of such a decree of a foreign
court whenever made where that nexus between the spouses and the
foreign state in fact existed at the time that it was made. To restrict
recognition to decrees made by a foreign court after the Act of 1949
was passed would be to defeat to that extent the public policy of avoid-
ing "limping marriages" which is the purpose and justification of the
changes which the courts since Travers v . Holley, [1943] P . 246, have
been making in the common law as to the recognition of the effective-
ness of foreign judgments of dissolution of marriage."
Turning to the proper function of the courts, Diplock L.J .
points out that the common law is not changeless . "It is the func-
tion of the courts to mould the common law and to adapt it to the
changing society for which it provides the rules of each man's duty
to his neighbour. . . . And within the Emits that we are at liberty
to do so, let us adapt the common law in a way that makes com-
monsense to the common man.1132 On that basis, he did not hesitate
to reject the narrower basis of recognition of foreign decrees of
dissolution which Latey J. adopted in the court below. To recog-
nize the effectiveness of the Czech decree accords, "better with the
public policy of avoiding 'limping marriages' and with what the
common man would think was common sense" . 33
This Policy-oriented approach to the solution of conflict of
laws problems did not satisfy Russell L.J. who, in a dissenting
opinion, also took a narrower basis of recognition. His legalistic
21 [1966] 2 W.L.R. 892, at p . 901 .
10 Supra, footnote 17, at p . 615 .
11 Ibid. 32Ibid. 31 Ihid.
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approach as to whether the Act of 1949 could retroactively validate
the Czech divorce seems correct up to a certain point only . He
quite properly states that : "The validity (or effect) in English law
of the English post-1949 marriage must have depended upon the
matrimonial status in English law of the husband at the time when
it was contracted. That in turn must have depended upon the
validity (or effect) in English law of the pre-1949 Czech divorce.
When that decree was made it cannot be doubted that in English
law it was invalid and ineffective, and effected in English law no
change in the matrimonial status of the husband. At that time it is
beyond dispute that English law required her to bring proceedings
in this country if she wanted a divorce." Thus, according to Russell
L.J., the Act of 1949 could not validate in English law, on the day
on which it came into operation, all invalid foreign divorce decrees
in cases where the appropriate conditions existed, automatically
altering on that day the matrimonial status in English law of the
parties. Why Dot? It would seem that as long as, on the date of
remarriage, the Czech divorce could have been recognized as valid
on the basis of Travers v . Holley, the husband was capable of
contracting marriage .
Actually, the 1937 and 1949 statutes dealt with future divorces
in England only, therefore one cannot argue that they should only
have prospective operation also with respect to foreign divorces .
As the majority of the Court of Appeal points out, the issue is
simply a question of recognition by the English court of a foreign
decree, and there is no reason why the court should not be able
to make the doctrine of Travers v. Holley34 retrospective . In cases,
where the circumstances of the foreign decree are such that, if it
were made at the time of the remarriage or at the date ofthe English
proceedings, it could have been validly made in English law, it will
be recognized as valid in England. As Mr. Grodecki points out,
the fact that a judicial rule is modelled on the analogy of a statute,
does not mean that it should share with that statute its non-retro-
active character :35
There would seem no warrant for such a finding, with its logical corol-
lary, that in order to obtain recognition in this country, the foreign
decree must have been made since 1953 [date of Travers v . Holley] . If
in fact the Acts [of 1937 and 19491 had been concerned with recognition
a conflict would have arisen between the judicial rule and the new
statutory rule and, subject to special transitional provisions in the Acts,
the Finnish decree in Arnold [1957] P. 377 could not have been recog-
Supra, footnote 1 .
Loc. cit., supra, footnote 15, at p . 62.
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nised . This result would be so inconvenient as to force the conclusion
that in such an event the Acts would have indubitably been made, in
some measure at any rate, retrospective.
It is true that the. solution adopted by the majority could lead
to some difficulties andshould not be followed when it would defeat
vested rights . For instance, where there is a pre- 1949 foreign decree
followed by apre-1949 English marriage, it might be wrong to hold
the marriage valid in post-1949 proceedings. Or, as Russell L.J.
points out:36
. Suppose a relevant pre-1949 decree of divorce, and a pre-1949
death of the husband intestate with estate in England, not having .
attempted remarriage, the wife would in English law have rights to his
estate accruing on his death as being his widow . Would the coming
into operation of the Act of 1949 deprive her of those rights? And, if
so,'would such deprivations be limited to undistributed assets?
It is perhaps, however, asserted as a proposition of English law,
that if the event upon which English law operates (e.ff. remarriage,
.or death intestate) and which is related for its validity or effect to a pre-
1949 . foreign decree, is itself post-1949, the foreign decree is valid in
English law ; but if the event is pre-1949 the foreign decree is invalid
in English law . But this limited way of putting the case still does not
appeal to me. As I see it, it comes back in the end to the proposition
that the Act of 1949 operated in English law to alter the then existing
matrimonial status ; and that proposition that the Act of 1949 operated
in English law to alter the then existing matrimonial status ; and that
proposition I cannot accept.
However, if the relevant date is that of the remarriage, and at
that timethe foreign divorce could have been recognized as valid
in England, these problems : do not arise and one need not be con
cerned with vested rights . If, on the other hand, one considers as
relevant the date of the English proceedings and the remarriage
took place before the domestic legislation was enacted, Russell
L.J.'s remarks have much force.
Russell L.J. rejects the argument based on the public policy of
avoiding "limping marriages" on the ground that it has been
singularly ignored by the legislature except in a few special cases .
Yet he is forced to admit that the attitude of the English courts-to
foreign divorce decrees has been conditioned by domestic legis-
lation. Since legislation is prospective, why does he ask, should the
judiciary adopt a retrospective attitude? The public policy of
avoiding "limping marriages", "must be preserved within the
framework of English legislation and law as it stands at the time
when the foreign decree, which is one leg of the limp, was made.
"' Supra, footnote 17, at pp . 616-617 . See also the example given byLatey J., supra, footnote 29, at p . 901 .
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Thejudiciary is not unfettered by domestic legislation in pursuing
such public policy, otherwise all limping marriages would be
avoided by recognition of all foreign divorce decrees" .37
Finally his Lordship argues that from a "common man's"
point of view whose supposed reactions might not always "be
a dependable guide through the necessarily complicated path of a
legal system"" the facts of the case call for a dismissal of the
appeal .
This decision is of great value, first of all because the majority
of the Court of Appeal took great pains to explain the ratio deci-
dendi of Travers Y . Holley" and to analyse the consequences which
follow from it. Secondly, by deciding that recognition of foreign
divorce decrees should not be restricted to those made by foreign
courts after the Act of 1949 was passed, the Court ofAppeal breaks
new ground and puts the finishing touches on Travers v. Holley
with respect to conflict of laws in time .
In this case, the conflict oflaws in time, involves a change in the
conflict rule of the forum.41 We must ask ourselves whether Travers
v . Holley, a judicial decree which reverses an earlier judicial rule,
should have a retrospective effect . The majority of the Court of
Appeal found no difficulty in holding that a new English common
law rule of conflict of laws may be made to apply to a legal situa-
tion which came into existence before the adoption of the new rule .
This approach is consistent with the view that judge-made law is
retrospective, whereas statute law is usually prospective. Neverthe-
less, as Dr . Morris observes," sharing Russell L.J.'s doubts : "But
what is the position when a rule ofjudge-madelawis modelled onthe
analogy of a prospective statute. Is the new rule fully retrospective,
or only to the date when the statute came into force?" As Mr.
Grodecki points oUt,42 "the position should not be different, retro-
activity is implicit in judge-made rules" .
The change in the conflict rule of the recognising court was
only indirectly based on the modification of the domestic law by
Parliament, therefore the question of the retroactive application
17 Ibid., at p . 617. 13 Ibid. 39 Stipra, footnote 1 .
40 See authors cited, supra, footnote 15, In Canada, J.-G . Castel, Con-
flict of Laws in Space and in Time (1961), 39 Can . Bar Rev. 604 . A change
in the conflict rule of the forum does not differ from a change in any other
rule of law and its effect must be ascertained in accordance with English
rules of statutory interpretation and judicial precedent. In general there is
a strong but rebuttable presumption that a statute is not intended to have
retrospective effect. See J . H . C. Morris, loc. cit., footnote 15, at p . 423 .
41 Loc. cit., footnote 15, at p . 424 ; Russell L.J ., supra, footnote 17,
at p . 617 .
42 Loc. cit., supra, footnote 15 .
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of a statutory rule could not arise. Again it must be emphasized
that the court was faced with the problem of determining the
respective scope of operation in time of successive common law
rules of conflict of laws and the majority decided to give retro-
spective effect to the principle of Travers v. Holley. This approach
accords with established principles . The Court of Appeal was free
to decide this question
'
completely unfettered by any legislative
provision or rule of statutory interpretation . There is no reason
why a common law rule should not be made retrospective, as long
as vested rights are not infringed.
Indyka v. Indyka" is also of interest to students ofjurisprudence
as the majority of the court emphasized that its decision was
motivated by public policy. A policy-oriented approach to the
solution of conflict of laws problems is not new, although judges
often hesitate to acknowledge it openly. The courts are always
prepared to modify the common law to adapt it to a changing
society. This attitude clearly indicates that today, the declaratory
theory of precedent is no longer a basic principle of the common
law. However, it does not mean that when a precedent is over-
ruled by'a higher court, the effect should not be retrospective. A
legalistic approach must yield to strong public policy reasons.
Actually, even from a legalistic point of view, it seems that the
result could be upheld. The problem was whether, on March 20th,
1959, when the husband went through the second ceremony of
marriage in England, he was capable of doing so. Such capacity
did exist because, at that time, by virtue of the 1949 Act and the
rationale of Travers v. Holley, his divorce, if it hadheen questioned
then, would have been recognized as valid in England, the country
of his domicile . Thus, contrary to what Latey J. held,44 it is possible
to recognize the decree as effective not because English courts
would not have recognized it at the time when it was made but
because they would have recognized it as effective at the time of
the second marriage .
It would seem that in matrimonial cases, the decisive date
should be when the second marriage takes place and not neces-
sarily, as some scholars have proposed:41 and the majority of the
Court of Appeal has decided '46 when the foreign proceedings come
11 Supra, footnote 17 . For a criticism see F. A . Mann, (1967), 30 Mod.
L. Rev . 94 . The case is also noted in (1967), 83 L.Q . Rev . 6 .
1 Supra, footnote 29, at p. 901 . d5 See op . cit ., footnote 15 .Wh 46 Supra, footnote 17, per Lord Denning at p . 609 : " . . . no matter
ether the divorce was granted before or after December, 1949" ; per
Diplock J ., at p . 615 : "1 see no reason why . . . we are not entitled to recog
nise the validity of such a decree of a foreign court whenever made . . . ."
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into question before the English courts . In the present case, to
consider as decisive the date of the second marriage, would be
consistent with the view that a person's capacity is governed by the
law of his domicile . 47
In summary, Indyka v . Indykall constitutes an important land-
mark in the development of conffict of laws in space and time in
the field of recognition of foreign divorces in England as it solves
another difficult problem arising from Travers v. Holley."
J.-G. CASTEL*
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-ExcEss OF AUTHORITY BY PUBLIC OR QUASI-
PUBLIC BODY-PUBLIC INTEREST AFFi,:CTED-STATUS OF INDIVIDUAL
TO BRING ACTION FOR DECLARATION THAT CANADIAN BROAD-
CASTING CORPORATION ACTED Ultra Vires-NECESSITY FOR SPECIAL
DAMAGE.-The poverty of Canadian public law has once again
been illustrated by the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Coivan
v . Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.'
The parties were a member of Parliament and a federal Crown
corporation, and the issues included the status of the French lang-
See also P . R . H . Webb, Note (1958), 7 Int . and Comp . L.Q . 374, at pp .
383-384 and Garwood v . Garwood (1964), 108 S.J . 359 which involved the
same problem as in Indyka v. Indyka . In a short note on the case, it is
reported that Faulks J . recognized a decree granted in 1942 in the United
States of America, on the basis of residence, as validly dissolving the
marriage in English law.
47 See for instance Sheldon v . Douglas (No . 1) (1962), 4 F.L.R . 104, at
p . 108, [1963] S.R.N.S.W . 442, where Nield J . for the Supreme Court of
New South Wales held that : "It does not seem to me, however, that any
later date can be looked to than the date of the marriage in 1947 [between
the petitioner and the respondent] because the marriage then was either
void or valid and I cannot see that legislation not directly concerned there-
with could validate what was invalid as far as the marriage was concerned."
At that time, the jurisdictional basis of the Californian decree of divorce
granted in 1942 and sought to be recognized in New South Wales in 1962
was not the same in substance as the New South Wales exception from
the strict rule that jurisdiction depended on domicile. Hence, the decree
would not be recognized as valid in New South Wales as a decree which
was valid under the common law rule that courts will recognize a juris-
diction which they themselves claim . The idea of substituting a period of
residence for domicile in the case of a woman did not come until 1955 in
the Commonwealth of Australia . Therefore, to consider the question
whether permanent residence in California for more than twelve months
should be regarded as substantially equivalent to three years residence in
Australia was beside the point."
48 Supra, footnote 17 . 49 Supra, footnote 1 .
*J.-G . Castel, S.J.D ., of Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto .
1 [1966] 2 O.R . 309, 56 D.L.R . (2d) 578 (C.A .) . Leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada was refused on June 13th, 1966 .
